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YEARWORTH V. NORTH BRISTOL NHS TRUST:
PROPERTY, PRINCIPLES, PRECEDENTS
AND PARADIGMS
SHAWN H.E. HARMON* AND GRAEME T. LAURIE**
IT IS obvious, but perhaps not always appreciated, that the human
body is essential. As a nexus of human value, on the one hand, and
vessel of instrumentalisation, on the other, it has been a source of both
respect and confusion as far as the law is concerned: respect in the sense
that the body and the integrity of the person are paramount; confusion
in the sense that the law has long resisted one of the ultimate expres-
sions of value and identity – self-ownership. Until such a time as we
might digitise the living consciousness (which again raises issues of
instrumentalisation), the body will remain central to the human ex-
perience and indeed to human existence. The body, then, is an artefact
of value (making property an unavoidable temptation), and an artefact
through which we give expression to values (i.e. a means through which
we enjoy or benefit from intangibles, such as dignity and autonomy). In
the recent case of Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust,1
the Court of Appeal for England and Wales handed down a decision
which engages meaningfully (if not always explicitly) with both of these
aspects of the body, but to what long-term effect? This is the question
which occupies this article. After briefly reviewing the facts and claims
in Yearworth, we examine: (1) the property aspect of the judgment,
considering its significance with respect to how and to what extent it
advances the property paradigm; and (2) the values/principles aspect of
the judgment, considering its position in relation to (troubling)
emerging medical law trends. In short, this article assesses Yearworth in
relation to two jurisprudential streams, offering some observations as
to what sort of precedent this case might represent for the future.
I. YEARWORTH: THE FACTS AND CLAIMS
Six male claimants, including Yearworth, were diagnosed with cancer
and consented to chemotherapy at the Southmead Hospital, Bristol,
which treatment had the possibility of rendering them infertile.
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1 Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] 2 All E.R. 986 (CA).
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Southmead Hospital has a fertility clinic licensed under the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended (HFEA 1990), and
offered to freeze and store samples of each claimant’s semen for use at a
later date. Each claimant agreed to this proposition, produced a sample
and gave assent to a 10-year storage period. The agreement resulted in
the generation of a Sperm Storage Request, a Consent to Storage and
Use, and a Sperm Storage for Those Undergoing Chemotherapy for
each claimant. These documents contained a variety of representations,
including some relating to storage and future use.
Following completion of these documents, and prior to the use of
the sperm by any of the claimants, the storage system failed, causing
the samples to thaw and be irreversibly damaged. The claimants ini-
tiated the within action, each alleging that he suffered an adverse or
traumatic reaction to the news, including mental distress or mild/
moderate depression. The defendant Trust admitted that it had a duty
to take reasonable care of the sperm and that it had failed to do so
by neglecting to replenish the liquid nitrogen tanks when it knew or
ought to have known that they required attention. However, it denied
liability, arguing that, even if its breach caused injury or distress
(which was denied), the claimants were barred from recovering
damages because the loss of sperm was neither a ‘personal injury’ nor
‘damage to property’.
The claimants advanced three arguments before the Court of
Appeal, namely that they: (1) suffered personal injuries caused by
negligence; (2) suffered damage to property due to negligence; and
(3) suffered losses resulting from breach of bailment conditions. The
Court, per Lord Judge C.J. (Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. and Wilson L.J
concurring), rejected the personal injury claim relatively perfunctorily,2
allowed the bailment claim,3 which has been considered elsewhere,4
and accepted bailment as a potential basis for a remedy for psychiatric
2 Ibid, paras. 18–24. The claimants argued that they had created and not abandoned their sperm,
which had retained its active properties, was meant to be used in its normal capacity, and should
give rise to a claim for personal injury. The Court disagreed, differentiating the German case
referred to by the claimants and stating, at para. 23: “… Although we understand the contrary
argument, it would be a fiction to hold that damage to a substance generated by a person’s body,
inflicted after its removal for storage purposes, constituted a bodily or ‘personal injury’ to
him. …We must deal in realities. To do otherwise would generate paradoxes, and yield
ramifications, productive of substantial uncertainty, expensive debate and nice distinctions in an
area of law which should be simple, and the principles clear.”
3 Ibid, paras. 46–50. This claim was argued for the first time before, and at the behest of, the Court
of Appeal. The Court stated, at para. 47, that, from its conclusion that the men had ownership of
the sperm for the purposes of tort, “it follows a fortiori that the men had sufficient rights in
relation to it as to render them capable of having been bailors of it.” The Court distinguished
Washington University v. Catalona et al. (2006) 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (Dist Ct), concluding that a
gratuitous bailment existed, and that the defendant was therefore liable under the law of bailment.
4 See M. Quigley, ‘Property: The Future of Human Tissue?’ (2009) 17Med. Law. Rev. 457–466, and
C. Hawes, ‘Property Interests in Body Parts: Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust’ (2010)
73 M.L.R. 130–140. For more on bailment, see N. Palmer, Bailment, 2nd ed. (London 1991), and
M. Bridge, Personal Property Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford 2002).
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injury.5 It also, importantly, allowed the broader property claim, and it
is this claim with which we are most interested, and to which we now
turn.
II. YEARWORTH: THE DECISION AND PRINCIPLES
At the outset, the Court accepted that a claim for negligent loss of
property must be founded on legal ownership or possessory title of
the subject held by the claimant at the time of the loss. Premising its
analysis on the conviction that advances in medical science are de-
manding a re-analysis of the common law’s approach to ownership of
parts and products of living bodies, particularly where originators are
concerned,6 the Court continued:
… [W]e are not content to see the common law in this area found-
ed upon the principle in Doodeward, which was devised as an ex-
ception to a principle, itself of exceptional character, relating to
the ownership of a human corpse. Such ancestry does not com-
mend it as a solid foundation. Moreover, a distinction between the
capacity to own body parts or products which have, and which
have not, been subject to the exercise of work or skill is not entirely
logical. …7
The Court took notice of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA 2004),
which statutorily entrenches the holding in Doodeward 8 by permitting
commercial dealings in human material which is the subject of property
as a result of the application of human skill.9 However, the Court was
careful to point out that the HTA 2004 is only peripherally relevant
given the involvement of gametes, which are governed by the HFEA
1990.10 Additionally, despite Parliament’s apparent instruction, the
5 On damages, the Court, at para. 60, noted a need for further factual determinations. At paras.
54–55, it stipulated that each claimant would have to demonstrate that his psychiatric injury was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach, whether the duty was considered under tort or
bailment. It also noted that recovery may be subject to the same public policy limitations that
exist re: secondary victims: see Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C.
310 (HL).
6 Yearworth, para. 45(a) and (b). The new realities created by biomedicine, and the reliance of
those advancements on access to human tissue has been noted: see L. Andrews & D. Nelkin, Body
Bazaar: TheMarket for Human Tissue in the Biotechnology Age (New York, 2001), and C. Waldby
& R. Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism (Durham, NC
2006). For a macabre example of the new order, note the Mastromarino case in which a former
dentist conspired with funeral home directors to strip over 1,000 interned corpses of bones, skin,
and other tissue for sale to companies providing material for implants, grafts and other
procedures: see A. Feuer, ‘Dentist Pleads Guilty to Stealing and Selling Body Parts’, New York
Times, 19 March 2008.
7 Yearworth, para. 45(d). For more on the historical development of property and the human body,
see infra, and see R. Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body: Property Rights, Ownership and
Control (Oxford 2007).
8 Discussed below p. 481.
9 HTA 2004, s. 32(9).
10 HTA 2004, s. 53(1). At the time of the case, the 2008 amendments to the HFEA 1990 were not yet
in force, but none of the amendments would have had any bearing on the case.
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Court stipulated that this statutory regime cannot and must not stifle
the development of the common law where it rests “on a broader
basis”.11 Precisely what is the nature of this broader basis and the
implications of recognising it are the concern of this article.
While noting that storage of the sperm in liquid nitrogen represents
an application of skill conferring on the sperm a substantially different
attribute12 – a fact which might vest property in the Trust, negating the
claims – the Court preferred to consider the relative positions of the
parties as articulated in the HFEA 1990. It accepted that the claimants
alone, through their bodies, generated and ejaculated the sperm, and
that the sole object of the sperm (and storage) was for the claimants’
subsequent use to (genetically) reproduce.13 It then held:
 The HFEA 1990 was designed to give legal effect to principles of
good practice in modern reproductive medicine, and therefore
should not be interpreted as depriving individuals of the ability to
recover damages for a breach of a statutory duty.14
 One of the pillars of the HFEA 1990 as enunciated in Evans v.
Amicus Healthcare Ltd.,15 namely the requirement for informed
consent, is of paramount importance. The stringent consent
requirements instituted by the HFEA 1990 make clear that the
claimants have rights and the Trust, as license holder, has duties
and limitations; only the claimants, and nobody else, had rights in
relation to the sperm which they produced.16
 The interjection of the need for third party support (e.g. expert
storage and medical assistance to make subsequent use of the
sperm) does not diminish a right held by an individual.17
Extrapolating from the relative positions of the parties, and noting
that the Trust’s actions precluded the claimants from exercising their
rights, the Court held that the claimants had ownership of, and there-
fore property rights in, their sperm. Where these rights are negligently
infringed by a third party (e.g. the Trust), as was the case here, the
claimants could sue for damages.
So what is the significance of this decision, from both a property
perspective and a values/principles perspective? Let us consider.
11 Yearworth, para. 38.
12 Ibid, para. 45(c).
13 Ibid, para. 45(f).
14 Ibid, para. 41.
15 [2005] Fam. 1 (CA).
16 Yearworth, para. 44. Of course, recognising a right does not necessarily imply a property right or
demand the creation of a property right.
17 Ibid, para. 45(f).
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III. MEDICINE AND THE “BODY”: PROPERTY, PRECEDENTS,
YEARWORTH AND “PARADIGM CREEP”?
For many centuries, the body has been central to biomedical science
and the development of medicine and healthcare. In particular, the
dead body has been a source of knowledge and discovery. In the
modern setting, the body’s contribution to innovation has expanded
to living bodies and their parts and products. Despite the role of
commerce and (intellectual) property in the development of biomed-
icine, the orthodox position with respect to the human body has
been that there can be no property interest in the human body,
living or dead, a prohibition which evolved in no small part due
to the traditions and machinations of the Church,18 and which
has been supported by a host of international and domestic
bodies.19
A. The Way We Were
If we are to evaluate the significance of Yearworth, we must locate the
decision within the constellation of property-in-the-body cases. In
short, at the risk of reciting a well-known story, we must nonetheless
‘begin at the beginning’.20
The general legal prohibition against property in the whole body
finds its origin in the context of corpses,21 the doctrine having been ex-
pounded in the seventeenth century,22 and reiterated in a host of
cases thereafter, including R. v. Lynn,23 R. v. Sharpe,24 Foster v. Dodd,25
18 See P. Jackson, The Law of Cadavers and of Burial Places, 2d ed. (New York 1950).
19 Internationally, see the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being With Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, ETS 1997,
No. 164, Article 21 (which states that “the human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to
financial gain”), and its Additional Protocol of the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, ETS 2002,
No. 168, Article 21 (which reiterates the prohibition on financial gain with some qualifications)
and Article 22 (which prohibits organ trafficking). In the U.K., see the General Medical Council,
Guidance for Doctors on Transplantation of Organs from Live Donors (1992), Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995), Medical Research Council, Human
Tissue and Biological Samples for Use in Research: Operational and Ethical Guidelines (2001),
Part 2, the live Nuffield Council consultation on “Human Bodies in Medicine and Research”
(see http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/humanbody/page_1027.html), and others.
20 To quote L. Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865), or L. Kilmister (Moto¨rhead), ‘Keep
Us On The Road’ (1977).
21 See P. Skegg, ‘Human Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property’ (1975) 4 Anglo-
American Law Rev. 412–425, and a range of case law, infra.
22 See Haynes Case (1614) 77 E.R. 1389, and Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England
(1641), 3-203, who stated “The burial of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonis.”
Though see J. Mason & G. Laurie, “Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts in
the Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey” (2001) 64 Med. Law Rev. 710–729, who suggest that it
derives from a misinterpretation of precedent.
23 (1788) 2 T.R. 394.
24 (1857) 169 E.R. 959.
25 (1867) L.R. 3 Q.B. 67.
480 The Cambridge Law Journal [2010]
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R. v. Price,26 and Williams v. Williams.27 While this doctrine worked
some mischief in body-snatching scenarios,28 an all-too-common prac-
tice in the 1700s and 1800s,29 it has generally endured. For a more
recent legal articulation of permissible actions with respect to the
corpse, the HTA 2004 is useful; it permits ‘donation’ and ‘possession’
(storage and use) of a dead body by persons licensed by the Human
Tissue Authority, and embodies in statute the common law exception
which permits ownership (discussed below).30 And what of the living
(whole) body? Aside from that lamentable period in human history
when slavery and human ownership were legally recognised,31 the
prohibition against property has also included living bodies, the po-
sition being that unauthorised interference with a living body is an
invasion of a personal, not a proprietary, right.32 Most recently, note
R. v. Bentham,33 wherein the House of Lords held that a person does
not ‘possess’ his body or any part of it.
The prohibition was also applied to parts of the body, though the
dubiousness of the rule – so described in Doodeward v. Spence,34 and
Miner v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co,35 – has permitted the property
paradigm to encroach slowly upon the prohibition in this setting.
In Doodeward, the High Court of Australia recognized third party
ownership in a still-born two-headed foetus preserved some 40 years
previously. The court held that the lawful exercise of skill which gave
the body attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse founded a
right to proprietary possession. In Moore v. University of California,36
26 (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 247.
27 [1881–85] All E.R. 840. In this case, the court held that directions in a will to deliver the deceased’s
body to someone other than the executor are void and unenforceable because the Testator has no
property interest in the body. In the American context, see Sinai Temple v. Kaplan (1976) 127 Cal.
Rep. 80 (CA).
28 If there could be no property in the body, there could be no theft of the body, and therefore no
prosecution: see J. Mason and G. Laurie, n 22 above.
29 For more on the intimate relationship between body snatching and scientific advancement,
see J. Frank, ‘Body Snatching: A Grave Medical Problem’ (1976) 49 Yale J. Biology & Med.
399–410, I. Ross & C. Ross, ‘Body Snatching in Nineteenth Century Britain: From Exhumation to
Murder’ (1979) 6 Brit J. Law & Society 108–118, R. MacGillivray, ‘Body-Snatching in Ontario’
(1988) 5 Can. Bull. Med. History 51–60, M. Highet, ‘Body Snatching & Grave Robbing: Bodies
for Science’ (2005) 16 History & Anthropology 415–440, S. Shultz, Body Snatching: The Robbing
of Graves for the Education of Physicians in Early Nineteenth Century America (Jefferson 2005)
among others.
30 See HTA 2004, ss. 32(9) and (10), which except from the prohibition in commercial dealing in
human tissue material which is the subject of property because of an application of human skill.
See also HTA 2004, ss. 1(1), (2), (3), 8, and Schedule 1.
31 See Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl. 323, wherein slaves pitched into the sea were characterised
as goods thrown overboard,Hopkins v. Blanco (1974) 320 A 2d 139, wherein a wife was considered
the property of her husband, and B. Dickens, ‘The Control of Living BodyMaterials’ (1977) 27 U.
Tor. Law J. 142–198, who notes that a debtor could, at one time, be personally attached for
payment of debts.
32 P. Matthews, ‘Whose Body? People As Property’ (1982) 36 Current Legal Problems 193–239.
33 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1057 (HL).
34 (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406 (Aust HC).
35 (1910) 15 W.W.R. 161 (Alta QB).
36 (1990) 793 P. 2d 479 (Cal SC).
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a US case focused on intellectual property, the majority held that a
third party could have a proprietary interest in excised tissue, but not
the originator of that tissue. This led Broussard J, dissenting, to
observe that, “the majority’s analysis cannot rest on the broad prop-
osition that a removed part is not property, but … on the proposition
that a patient retains no ownership interest in [an excised] body
part … .”37
In the UK, the court in R. v. Kelly,38 recognised property rights in
excised body parts where they had been subjected to dissection, pres-
ervation or otherwise acquired different attributes by the application of
skill.39 While the court questioned the origin of the ‘application of skill’
principle, it acquiesced to common law precedent, suggesting that it
was Parliament’s responsibility to intervene if deemed appropriate. In
A.B. v. Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust,40 in response to claims of
negligence for psychiatric injury and for wrongful interference with
the body in relation to the manner of obtaining parental consent to
post-mortems and body parts retention, the court confirmed both the
no-property rule and the ‘application of skill’ exception, holding that
the post-mortem examinations were lawfully executed and therefore
capable of giving the pathologist possessory rights to retained samples.
Ultimately, the court refused to create a common law tort of wrongful
interference with, or conversion of, the body where none previously
existed. The HTA 2004 statutorily entrenches the ‘application of skill’
exception, permitting licensed persons to remove, store and use
material (including human cells, but not embryos outside the human
body or hair and nails, from the body of a living person) for a number
of purposes, including, inter alia, obtaining scientific or medical infor-
mation about a living or deceased person, research, and transplan-
tation.41
With respect to products produced by the human body, prosecu-
tions for theft were sustained against those who stole products
from those in lawful possession of them in R. v.Herbert (lock of hair),42
37 See also J. Mason &G. Laurie, n 21 above, who, at 719, state that, ‘the law tempers the consequent
confusion in delivering one clear message: the one person who is least likely to have property rights
in body parts is the person from whom these parts were taken.’
38 [1998] 3 All E.R. 741 (CA).
39 This right is limited by standards of public decency: see R. v. Gibson [1990] 2 Q.B. 619 (CA),
wherein a freeze-dried human foetus was used to make earrings for display in an art gallery and
was considered a breach of the common law offence of outraging public decency.
40 [2005] 2 W.L.R. 358 (QB).
41 See HTA 2004, s. 53 and Schedule 1. Ultimately, however, the HTA 2004 does not clearly
theoretically ground its provisions in property, or control, or any other founding principle. In this
regard, in Venner v. State of Maryland (1976) 354 A. 2d 483 (Ct Spec Apps), at 498, Powers J held
that, ‘It is not unknown for a person to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or
control… over such things as … organs or other parts of the body …’ [emphasis added].
42 (1961) 25 J. Crim. Law 163. A lock of Byron’s hair was sold at Sotheby’s Auction House in 1970
for £320: P. Skegg, n 20 above.
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R. v. Welsh (urine sample),43 and R. v. Rothery (blood sample).44 But
it was in Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County,45 that an originator
was (finally) found to have a proprietary interest. In that case, a man
deposited sperm in a bank for his partner’s later use, a disposition he
articulated in his will. The California Court of Appeal distinguished
Moore and held that the testator had a proprietary interest in his
genetic material (sperm) under probate law and could bequeath it to
his partner, an act which implicitly recognised the proprietary nature of
the material, and the testator’s proprietary interest therein.
So how does Yearworth fit into the stream? Quite neatly in some
respects, and rather uncomfortably in others.
As can be seen, there has been a readiness to recognise the right to
control the human body and its parts and products, and there has been
a gradual expansion of the persons entitled to exercise those rights.
Thus, with respect to corpses, there has been a recognition of rights to
possession by survivors and other legally recognised interested parties.46
With respect to excised body parts and products, there has been a rec-
ognition of a fuller bundle of rights, including the acceptance of com-
mercialisation and markets.47 And while tissue originators were usually
left without rights in these settings, even that bulwark of the common
law came down (in Hecht). Viewed against this backdrop – with its
examples of judicial dissatisfaction with the property prohibition –
Yearworth is inarguably predictable and cannot be considered an
‘outlier’; it is ‘the next step’ in the slow creep of the property paradigm.
Having said that, it should be recognised that the rulings in this
stream of cases are often pragmatic fixes to practical problems; they are
ad hoc solutions based on what is thought at that moment and within
the context of the specific facts of the case to be in the interests of
justice. The stream has evolved in fits and starts and rights have been
43 [1974] R.T.R. 478 (CA).
44 [1976] R.T.R. 550 (CA).
45 (1993) 20 Cal.R. 2d 275 (Cal CA).
46 Many US jurisdictions adopt a flexible approach to corpses and survivors’ rights and duties,
deploying the language of trusts, which permit damages for mental distress caused to survivors
when the body is dealt with unlawfully: see M. Pawlowski, ‘Property in Body Parts and Products
of the Human Body’ (2009) 30 Liverpool Law Rev. 35–55. Similarly, in the UK, it has been held
that a deceased’s personal representatives (or others charged by law) have a right to custody and
possession of the body with a view to its proper disposition: see R. v. Bristol Coroner, ex parte Kerr
[1974] Q.B. 652, Dobson v. North Tyneside Health Authority [1996] 4 All E.R. 474 (CA), and
others.
47 See National Health Service Act 1977, s. 25. On this point, the Secretary of State has statutory
power to charge for body parts not readily available to any person, and certain organisations
acquire excised parts and supply them to researchers on a commercial basis, and both transplant
services and pituitary glands from cadaver brains are sold commercially: see L. Lehtonen, ‘The
Bioethics Convention of the Council of Europe and Organ Sharing for Transplant Recipients in
Scandinavia’ (2002) 21 Med. Law 745–751, and G. Dworkin & I. Kennedy, ‘Human Tissue:
Rights in the Body and Its Parts’ (1993) 1 Med. Law Rev. 291–319, who, at p. 305, cite the
International Institute for the Advancement of Medicine and Human Biologics Inc as a prime
operator in the body parts market.
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extended unevenly. Thus, while some parties could claim rights of
property, there was no self-ownership, and while commercial trade in
human bodies, parts and products (and the property on which such
commerce relies) had been accepted, the lingering uneasiness with
property as a blanket solution meant that the prohibitions continued to
affect tissue originators. In short, while this history does represent an
evolution toward the property paradigm (with ‘property’ featuring to
different degrees in the decisions), it is not a conscious and principled
development of the property paradigm, and it never explicitly engaged
with self-ownership. Yearworth is distinguishable in that it does engage
with, and extend, self-ownership, though this might not be seen as a
surprising or unpredictable progression.
B. The Good, the Bad, and the Unanswered Questions
There are some aspects or some achievements of Yearworth that are
clearly good. First, by its open and explicit recognition that parts and
products of the human body may be the subject of property without
the acquisition of different attributes by the application of skill, it has
potentially cleared away a piece of legal artifice that has bemused
commentators for some time.48 Second, by extending the right of own-
ership to originators of human tissue, the Court has thrown into
question an inadequately justified and much criticised limitation on
rights attaching to biomedically valuable tissue; it may have taken a
first step toward treating all participants in the new bio-society equally,
and therefore reduced a clear injustice (if it is accepted as something
more than a fact-specific quick fix). Third, by its finding of property,
and its associated opening up of bailment law to tissue originators, it
has widened the possibilities for recovery where interference and/or loss
occurs.
But how has it managed the extension of property? In this regard, it
has not performed quite so well. Consider first the finding of a property
right itself. Having rights (even sole rights) of control over something
does not require or even necessarily imply property.49 Property is
merely one negotiated and evolving legal concept which permits us to
organise society according to a particular value system and/or in
48 This is a legal fiction that has a much-maligned sibling in patent law insofar as modern patent
instruments, including the Biotech Patenting Directive 98/44/EC, circumvent the prohibition
against patenting mere discoveries by allowing inventors to patent biological discoveries by
removing them from their natural environment and purifying them. For a comment on this,
see J. Sulston, ‘Heritage of Humanity’ (2002), available at http://mondediplo.com/2002/12/
15genome.pdf [accessed 9 March 2006], and J. Sulston, ‘Staking Claims in the Biotechnology
Klondike’ (2006) 84 W.H.O. Bull. 412–414.
49 J. Berg, ‘You Say Person, I Say Property: Does it Really Matter What we Call an Embryo?’ (2004)
4 Am. J. Bioethics 17–18, and J. Berg, ‘Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to
Embryos and Fetuses’ (2005) 40 Wake Forest Law Rev. 159–220.
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pursuit of particular goals. Unfortunately, the conceptual foundation
of the Court’s finding of a (new) property interest is not entirely clear,
and neither the brief reference to Honore´, nor the discussion of statu-
tory consent adequately fill the lacunae. From whence does this prop-
erty interest derive and why has it been so late in its recognition? Given
the moral debates around property in the body and the contentiousness
of commodifying the body,50 this is a philosophical, ethical and policy
question which should have been addressed as directly as was the
Court’s concern for the ‘application of skill’ exception.
It has been suggested that a neo-Lockean natural rights view might
have motivated the finding of property.51 Recall that, classically, the
natural rights approach views the earth as granted res communis to all
humankind by God, and considers that unclaimed material combined
with labour gives rise to individual ownership.52 Of course, this ap-
proach has been challenged as ‘nonsense upon stilts’.53 In any event,
such a foundation is not obvious given the dearth of attention paid by
the Court to ethical/moral or conceptual foundations. Alternatively,
one might argue that the evolution of the jurisprudence and the Court’s
reference to the need for the law to keep pace with medical practice
suggest a social constructivist approach. Under this approach, prop-
erty is viewed as a social arrangement that is not fixed, but evolves with
society’s needs.54 Presumably, this approach underwrote Honore´’s ele-
ven relational factors which, if enough of them are present, might
found a proprietary relationship between person and subject.55 Having
reference to this list, Campbell suggests that we may claim that our
bodies and their constituent parts are our property, but he asserts that
this conclusion does not solve the intimately related moral issues of the
consequence of this for commodification and trade.56 He concludes that
a property approach is not particularly satisfactory because the body is
not merely a vessel, but rather an integral, lived-in part of the embodied
self, and our obvious but often misunderstood relationship with our-
selves, others, and the earth gives rise to a certain ambiguity around the
body.57
50 See S. Harmon, ‘A Penny For Your Thoughts, A Pound For Your Flesh: Implications of
Recognizing Property in Human Body Parts’ (2006) 7 Med. Law Int. 329–354, and the authorities
cited therein, J. Mason & G. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 8th ed
(Oxford 2010), ch. 15, and the authorities cited therein.
51 M. Quigley, n 4 above.
52 J. Locke, Second Treatise on the Government (1690).
53 See J. Waldron, “Nonsense Upon Stilts”: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London
1987).
54 B. Bjo¨rkman & S. Hansson, ‘Bodily Rights and Property Rights’ (2006) 32 J. Med.Ethics 209–214
55 See T. Honore´, ‘Ownership’ in A. Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative
Work (Oxford 1961) 107–147.
56 A. Campbell, The Body in Bioethics (London 2009), p. 14.
57 Ibid, ch. 7.
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The point is that the Court failed to ground its finding of property,
or to engage meaningfully with the very rich and important bioethical
and legal scholarship on the subject. It even failed to apply the eleven
factors of Honore´ in a rigorous manner. The Court might have used the
unfairness argument advanced by Broussard J. inMoore as a platform
to discuss deeper and broader issues of justice and equity in arriving at
its conclusion, but it did not. Rather it simply held that the entitlements
and limitations under the HFEA 1990 and the need for the law to
evolve naturally crystallised into a right of control, which the Court
declared to be an ownership and indeed a property right. While this
might not be a particularly mighty leap, the fact that one (property)
does not necessarily follow the other (control), it was a leap that de-
manded a lot more justificatory work.
In the end, we are left to wonder at the foundation and appropri-
ateness of the Court’s conclusion that the claimants rightly have a
property interest in their body products or parts.58 How is the finding of
property conceptually defended? On what moral foundations is the
finding of property based? Might a better (more palatable) basis than
property be developed that adequately protects originator interests,
abilities to recover damages, and contribution to, and participation in,
the new bio-economy? In relation to the ‘application of skill’ exception,
it has been argued that ‘These … unresolved questions demonstrate
that the [underpinning] legal principle … has not been adequately
identified or articulated. Without a clear underlying principle the ex-
ception cannot develop in a coherent manner.’59 The same can be said
of the Yearworth finding of property itself.
We might also wonder what work the property paradigm is
being asked to do. It is not clear what bundle of property rights
have been extended to originators. Practical questions that remain
are:
 Is this putative extension of property (and the availability of
damages for mental distress) dependent on the fact that gametes –
which might be differentiated from other tissues – are in issue?60
How should non-reproductive tissue be approached?
 What is the scope of originators’ rights to treat with their own body
and parts? What, now, is the potential for originators of tissue to
participate in bio-markets?
58 In this respect, the tendency of court to ignore the sociological, psychological and anthropological
attitudes toward the body has been noted: see R. Gold, Body Parts: Property Rights and the
Ownership of Human Biological Material (Washington 1996).
59 R. Hardcastle, n 8 above, at p. 40.
60 We might characterise gametes as special based on their association with genetic reproduction and
having reference to the HFEA 1990. On the other hand, that differentiation may not be justified
for purposes of developing the common law more broadly.
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 Where and how does dignity and other important moral values fit
into the new regime? Are they justificatory factors for the (new)
right or restraining factors on its exercise (ie: autonomy might be
used to justify the existence of a property right and dignity might be
used to restrict its exercise).
 On what basis do we differentiate body parts and products from
whole bodies, living or dead, and what about material taken for
transplantation into another or back into oneself?
There are two consequences of these important outstanding questions:
(1) both the existence and exercise of the property right are in question;
and (2) both the nature and scope of Yearworth as a general precedent
are in some doubt. These and other questions will almost certainly be
tested in future cases as the Yearworth decision is probed, but little
instruction can be gleaned from this ‘root’ case itself.61
IV. MEDICINE AND THE ‘PERSON’: PRINCIPLES, PRECEDENTS,
YEARWORTH AND ‘PARADIGM SLIPPAGE’?
Health and wellbeing, and therefore healthcare and medicine, are not
just about the body, they are about the person; they are about the
physical, the non-physical and the rights and values we claim about and
as a result of our condition in relation to both. Good health has been
characterised:
 as a fundamental freedom, enabling us to define our identity and to
do things we value;62
 as being a right fundamental to the attainment of peace and secur-
ity;63 and
 as having special meaning insofar as we strive to achieve good
health in the face of conditions that mitigate against it.64
In short, health (and therefore healthcare) is essential for the enjoyment
and maximisation of almost all human activities and has implications
for one’s sense of being and empowerment. Given this wide-ranging
and multifaceted importance of health, it comes as little surprise that
patient interests and broad, value-based principles should be(come)
vitally important in the health setting, indeed often the central focus
of disputes. Indeed, we have seen a trend in recent years toward the
61 Thus far, the only case to cite Yearworth is AB and Others v. Ministry of Defence [2009] EWHC
1225 (QB), and that reference was only to note that Lord Judge C.J.’s statement to the effect that
the common law must remain relevant in light of ‘the ever-expanding frontiers of medical science’
is equally relevant to statutory interpretation.
62 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford 1999).
63 Preamble of the World Health Organization’s Constitution, available at http://apps.who.int/gb/
bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf.
64 N. Daniels, Just Health: A Population View (Cambridge 2008).
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recognition and development of health-related interests in law, of
which Yearworth is, arguably, the latest illustration.
A. The Way We Are
In evaluating the significance of Yearworth in this principle-arena, we
must now re-contextualise it, this time with respect to judicial trends on
the issue of the individual’s position as a value- and aspiration-holder
in medical treatment settings.
Traditionally, courts had fairly consistently shown deference to the
medical profession in determining that profession’s duty and standard
of care owed to patients, and in determining the best interests of pa-
tients. Conversely, there was only a grudging acceptance of the right to
self-determination by patients and, related thereto, the principle of
autonomy.65 The classic example is, of course, Bolam v. Friern Hospital
Management Committee,66 in which the House of Lords queried
(from the profession) what the standard of care should be based on
“a responsible body of medical opinion”.67 In Sidaway v. Board of
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital,68 the House of Lords went so
far as to say that professional (medical) judgement could determine
what information to provide to the patient when the patient was de-
ciding how to proceed (and whether to give consent to a procedure).69
Changes in judicial attitudes have, however, occurred, partially as a
result of the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998. In fact, they are
discernable as early as the late 1990s, when the House of Lords took
back control (contrary to the Bolam precedent) by requiring that
medical opinion must have a logical basis,70 and when the Court of
Appeal held that information disclosure decisions must be grounded on
a prudent patient test.71 These cases were followed by McFarlane v.
Tayside Health Board,72 and Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital
NHS Trust,73 both wrongful conception cases. In McFarlane, which
concerned the birth of a healthy child to healthy parents after a failed
vasectomy, the House of Lords rejected the negligence-based claim
for damages associated with raising the child, but permitted general
damages. Importantly, Lord Millett stated that the parents “have lost
the freedom to limit the size of their family [and have] been denied an
65 G. Laurie, ‘Medical Law and Human Rights: Passing the Parcel Back to the Profession’ in
A. Boyle et al. (eds.), Human Rights and Scots Law (Oxford 2002) 245–274.
66 [1957] 2 All E.R. 118 (HL).
67 See also Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634 (HL).
68 [1985] A.C. 871 (HL).
69 This physician-oriented approach to autonomy-based patient decisions was also adopted in
Scotland: see Moyes v. Lothian Health Board [1990] S.L.T. 444 (OH).
70 Bolitho v. Hackney Health Authority [1998] A.C. 232 (HL).
71 Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust (1999) 48 BMLR 118 (CA).
72 [2000] 2 A.C. 59 (HL).
73 [2004] 1 A.C. 309 (HL).
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important aspect of their personal autonomy,” thereby entitling them
to damages.74 In Rees, a healthy child was born to a disabled mother.
Again, the negligence-based claim for the costs of raising the child
were rejected, but “conventional damages” were viewed favourably
by Lord Bingham, who held that the opportunity to live one’s life in a
way wished and planned should not be negligently interfered with by
another.75
More recently, in Chester v. Afshar,76 the House of Lords again
recognised autonomy (or self-determination) as a key health-related
principle. In that case, the patient suffered from chronic pain. Surgery
was advised and ultimately performed. Absent negligence in the per-
formance of the surgery, the patient suffered nerve damage, which is a
known risk of very small likelihood but potentially significant conse-
quence. The patient had not been informed of this particular risk. As
noted, negligence in the surgical procedure could not be shown, so the
claimant alleged negligent failure to warn/inform. However, it was also
generally accepted that she could not prove that her injury was caused
by the negligent failure to inform (i.e. she could not show that she
would never have undergone the surgery had she known about the
risk). Nonetheless, the court found in her favour. Lord Steyn viewed
consent as protecting “respect for autonomy and dignity” (in addition
to physical integrity),77 Lord Hope focussed on “the right to choose”,78
and Lord Walker was concerned with the human right to “make one’s
own decisions”.79 In short, at the cost of well-established negligence
principles, the court awarded the claimant damages for her loss, in this
case being the right to exercise autonomy by making an adequately
informed choice.
All of these cases demonstrate that courts have decreasingly shown
deference to medical professionals and increasingly tried to provide
remedies to aggrieved patients under the broad rubric of choice, linked
to consent which is, in turn, linked to the ethical and legal value of
personal autonomy. In the latter cases, particularly McFarlane, Rees
and Afshar, they have done so to vindicate affronts to patients’
autonomy and/or dignity. In doing so, they have allowed claims which
do not fit comfortably with existing and well-grounded legal doctrines;
in a sense, the harm was to choice itself, a rather strange and alien legal
interest.
How does Yearworth fit into this stream? Again, rather neatly. In
Yearworth, the Court arrived at an arguably surprising conclusion on
74 McFarlane, para. 123.
75 Rees, para. 8.
76 [2005] 1 A.C. 134 (HL).
77 Ibid, paras. 14–18.
78 Ibid, para. 56.
79 Ibid, para. 92.
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tissue-originator property rights so that the claimants could access
remedies that are available under the common law (eg: through negli-
gence). In fact, in a commendable example of clairvoyance, the Court
opened a new issue – bailment – and invited submissions thereon,
which issue was wholly dependent on the finding (for the first time in
the UK) of originator property interests in bodily products. We would
therefore characterise Yearworth as ‘the next step’ in the gradual slip-
page of well settled principles (whether they be the negligence-based
requirements of causation or the long-standing prohibition against
people owning their bodies or parts or products thereof). It is an ex-
ample of the slow and selective dissolution of principles in favour of
pragmatism.
B. A Fist Full of Problems
The decision in Yearworth and its characterisation against the above
line of cases gives rise to a number of problems of which we will focus
on two. The first relates to the tendency of the above cases and of
Yearworth to provide a remedy in the face of difficult legal hurdles to
same. The second relates to the tendency in these cases, and again in-
ferred from Yearworth, to base justice-motivated remedies on vague
notions of autonomy. We will consider each problem in turn.
It is certainly laudable to wish to provide a remedy where a loss
has occurred, particularly where that loss is consequent on an iden-
tifiable party’s action or inaction. At a certain level of abstraction, a
fair-minded and rights/ethics-oriented approach which identifies just
outcomes and remedies and which reasons toward those outcomes/
remedies cannot be condemned.80 However, in the absence of well
conceived foundations and well articulated limits, such an outcome-
oriented approach will become deeply problematic in practice. One
might view the Court’s property approach as a natural if pragmatic
justice-providing vehicle, but the use of property seems to have been
used primarily as a (reflexive) means to make the claims fit within the
accepted parameters of negligence (i.e. property was found because of
the need for there to be a loss to property if not to the person in order
for the claims to sound in damages; it was inductive rather than de-
ductive reasoning).
Without wishing to belabour the foundational issues discussed
above, it is worth reiterating that the significance of the court’s finding
in Yearworth (i.e. the finding of property against the weight of pre-
cedent) demanded something more, from a remedy-justifying perspec-
tive, than the passing references made to the need for the common law
80 And one might cite the welcome justice extended against the weight of precedent from time to time
by ground-breaking judges like Lord Denning.
490 The Cambridge Law Journal [2010]
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Jun 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.197
to advance.81 In this regard, the Court cited R. v. Kelly,82 wherein Rose
L.J. noted that the common law does not stand still, and that a future
case may arise in which it becomes appropriate to characterise body
parts as property without the need to change their attributes through
work or skill.83 Of course, the common law must advance, but when it
does so, it should do so in a clear and defensible way. The rather un-
inspired and uninspiring advancement of the property paradigm in
Yearworth suggests that property was only used as a convenient vehicle
through which to achieve a certain outcome. But the property model
could lead to numerous harms, including exploitation and the dehu-
manisation of patients and people more generally.84 Thus, from a
justice-protecting perspective, much will depend on how Yearworth is
treated as a precedent.
Inductive reasoning aside, there appears to be some growing judicial
affinity for a free-standing right to autonomy. Such a right could lead
to the improper modification of longstanding negligence principles to
the detriment of the law and legal predictability, and to the detriment
of the health system and patients.85 We have already expressed concern
over their apparent modification to allow for recovery when one’s
autonomy has been affronted:
If this is the interest now to be given recognition, it has potentially
far-reaching implications for patients’ rights and doctors’ duties.
For one thing, it may require a role for the law beyond the con-
fines of the negligence action where injury is confined to that
which is physical, economic or psychiatric. Being deprived of a
choice does not fit within such categories, yet it is the basis
upon which the House of Lords was able to make the link to
Ms. Chester’s physical injury and so cast the action as a near-
approximation to a traditional negligence action. But we must ask
again, what if there was no physical injury? Is there a basis for
recovery nonetheless for affront to ‘mere, sheer choice’?86
Yearworthmay have moved us closer to an answer to our question, but
it moves us in a manner which does not fit comfortably into the mould
81 Yearworth, paras. 45(a) and (d).
82 See n 37 above.
83 And the Court may have cited any number of cases espousing this principle. For example, in
L. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and Secretary of State for Health [2008]
EWHC 2149 (Fam), while rejecting the submission that the common law could be a basis for
allowing the claimant to preserve, store and use her deceased husband’s sperm in the absence of his
prior written consent, the court also accepted that the common law ‘does not stand still’.
84 In this respect note A. Campbell, n 55 above.
85 And much consternation has been expressed over the apparent trajectory: see M. Hogg, “Duties of
Care, Causation and the Implications of Chester v. Afshar” (2005) 9 Edin. Law Rev. 156–167,
K. Mason & D. Brodie, “Bolam, Bolam – Wherefore Art Thou Bolam?” (2005) 9 Edin. Law Rev.
398–406, J. Stapleton, “Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v. Afshar” (2006)
122 L.Q.R. 426–448, and others.
86 G. Laurie, “Personality, Privacy and Autonomy inMedical Law” in N.Whitty & R. Zimmermann
(eds.), Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective (Dundee 2009) 453–484, at
p. 463.
C.L.J. Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust 491
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Jun 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.197
this stream of cases originally cast. Rather than diminish or avoid
traditional negligence principles (such as causation or the need for
physical injury), Yearworth reinterprets property so as to comply with
the negligence need for loss/injury, and in doing so, it joins ranks with
the above precedents. The Yearworth Court extended the property
paradigm in an effort to give a remedy (in negligence) to sympathetic
claimants who suffered a blow to their autonomy – in this case the
ability to have a family life that their ailments might have robbed them
of but for the existence of modern medical technologies, which, in this
case, were deployed negligently. That the Court is concerned with the
claimants’ (potential) loss of the ability to “live the life they had wished
and planned for” (to borrow the language used in Rees) is suggested by
the following:
… [W]e feel driven to observe that the judge’s analysis of causation
is controversial and would warrant careful reconsideration in the
light of evidence and submission at any further hearing. At that
stage Mr Townsend would advance a contrary analysis, namely
that the men’s apprehension that they might not regain their fer-
tility did not cause psychiatric injury because it was countered by
their knowledge of the storage of the sperm and that the injury
arose as a direct result of learning of its loss.87
Its keen cognizance of autonomy and the protection of individualistic
claims relating to the self is further suggested by its heavy reliance on
the statutory provisions which erect consent (an autonomy-based legal
tool) as a gate-keeping mechanism to legitimate certain dealings associ-
ated with the human body. By its apparent awareness of the claim-
ants’ autonomy interests, Yearworth fulfils the promise of the above
stream and represents another in this growing line of cases which is
reshaping or abandoning old practices in an effort to provide new
remedies.
Given the machinations in Yearworth, the questions of whether
there exists a pure “right to autonomy” and/or a right to a remedy for
loss of autonomy-based choice (unaccompanied by physical damage)
still remains. In this regard, we might take notice of the fact that
autonomy has already been recognised as an important principle
underlying several of the rights found in the European Convention on
Human Rights (1950).88 If a free-standing autonomy right is ultimately
found to exist, we might also take notice of the fact that, once a human
right has been recognised, an adequate remedy for its breach must be
87 Yearworth, para. 53.
88 In this regard, see Pretty v. U.K. (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1. See also Guerra & Others v. Italy (1998) 26
E.H.R.R. 357, and McGinley v. U.K. (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 1, both of which impose positive duties
on states to provide information to people so they might make autonomous choices on matters
concerning their health.
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provided.89 As we inch closer to a (currently vague) autonomy right
(as opposed to autonomy-based rights), it behooves the courts to
ground soundly, define precisely, and delimit rationally the right,
and to align it with existing legal doctrines without destroying those
doctrines in the process. Some explicit appreciation of the wider
consequences of such a judicial movement would also not go amiss.
V. CONCLUSION
For some, the Yearworth decision will be exciting and for others
troubling. For us, it is both. For example, while celebrating the Court’s
obvious desire to do justice and to provide a remedy where a loss has
been suffered as a result of another’s actions, one might deplore the
extension of the property paradigm and question why we are unable
(or unwilling) to articulate relationships and rights of control which
allow individuals to enjoy appropriate protections and liberties with
respect to their bodies without propertising them or eroding existing
legal doctrines.90 In any event, what is clear is that Yearworth is both
significant and disappointing, both for what it does and what it fails to
do. The extent of its significance has yet to be seen.
89 See ECHR, Art 13.
90 On this point, see Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust and Another (2007) 95 B.M.L.R. 1 (Ct Sess), a
Scottish case which offers an alternative approach based on human dignity. In that case, the
parent pursuer argued that, despite authorising a post-mortem, it was never explained to her that
this entailed removing and retaining organs from her deceased child. Her discovery of this led to
severe depression and, ultimately, to loss of employment. She argued that: (1) a negligence-based
duty to suitably inform and provide her with the opportunity to give appropriate consent to the
procedure, and, separately, to the removal and storage of tissue was breached; and (2) wrongful
interference with a corpse is actionable under Scots common law in its own right as an affront to
human dignity.
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